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SUBCLASSES-THE TEST CASE CONCEPT-
EISEN V. CARLISLE & JACQUELIN
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, Morton Eisen filed a class action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of the state of New York.
Eisen charged the country's two largest dealers in odd-lots,1 Carlisle
& Jacquelin and DeCoppet & Doremus, 2 with violations of the anti-
trust laws. It was later estimated by the district court judge that the
class defined by Eisen consisted of about 6,000,000 members of which
2,000,000 were identifiable.' Although the district court held, after
Normal trading units on stock exchanges are in multiples of 100 shares called "round-
lots." The term "odd-lot" is used to describe transactions involving less than 100 shares.
2 It has been estimated that Carlisle & Jacquelin and DeCoppet & Doremus handle ninety-
nine percent of the volume of odd-lot transactions on the New York Stock Exchange. SEC,
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS pt. II, at 172 (1963).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). Because of the
number of decisions generated by this case, abbreviated names have been given the opinions.
The following table lists the decisions in chronological order and shows the shortened name of
each as it will appear in this note:
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D. N.Y. 1966)
-Eisen (D.C.) I (held the action could not be maintained as a class action
because Eisen could not fairly and properly represent other members of the
class);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966)
-Eisen I (held the decision to dismiss Eisen's class action was appealable
under the "death knell" doctrine since it would for all practical purposes
terminate litigation in view of Eisen's seventy dollar individual claim);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968)
-Eisen II (reversed dismissal of class action);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)
-Eisen (D.C.) II (held that the issues of manageability and notice required
further consideration);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1971)
-Eisen (D.C.) III (held that the suit was maintainable as a class action and
that the circumstances of the case warranted a preliminary hearing on the
merits as a prelude to possible apportionment of costs of notice between
plaintiff and defendants);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. N.Y. 1972)
-Eisen (D.C.) IV (held that Eisen was more than likely to prevail on the
merits and that defendants would be required to bear ninety percent of the
costs of notice);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973)
-Eisen III (held that the action was not maintainable as a class action
because of manageability problems, rejected the fluid recovery device, re-
jected the preliminary hearing on the merits, and held that individual notice
to all identifiable class members was required by Rule 23);
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the much noted minihearing on the merits,4 that Eisen's class was
"more than likely to prevail" on the merits of the case,5 the United
States Supreme Court held that no determination on the merits
would be allowed until the identified members of the class were noti-
fied. As a practical matter, the cost of such notice put an end to the
entire suit. The Eisen case has been extensively commented upon at
all stages.7 This note will focus upon the suggestion, made by Judge
Oakes' in the circuit court of appeals and in the Supreme Court by
Justice Douglas,9 that this action might be pursued if the gargantuan
class alleged by Eisen were divided into smaller more manageable
subclasses.
II. THE SUGGESTION
Judge Oakes succinctly stated the problems that he felt might be
generated by the decision.
The panel opinion seems on its face to give a green light to monopo-
lies and conglomerates who deal in quantity items selling at small
prices to proceed to violate the antitrust laws, unhampered by any
realistic threat of private consumer civil proceedings, leaving it to
some vague future act of Congress to protect the innocent con-
sumer. The panel opinion as I read it tells polluters that they are
pretty safe from class actions because even if a whole city is blan-
keted in smoke or its water supply contaminated, the plaintiffs can
never advance the money for notices to, say, all the people in the
city phone book, who certainly are identifiable."0
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
-Eisen (held individual notice to all identifiable class members was required
by rule 23 and that the preliminary hearing on the merits was improper).
The preliminary hearing on the merits, often referred to as a "minihearing," was first
used in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D. N.Y. 1967). The minihearing on the merits
has been the subject of numerous law journal articles. See, e.g., Weinstein, Some Reflections
on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 303-04 (1973); Note, 54 B.U.L. REv.
II, 127-35 (1974) (comparing the Eisen (D.C.) IV minihearing with the Dolgow v. Anderson
minihearing); Casenote, 40 U. CoLO. L. REv. 462 (1968) (discussing the Dolgow v. Anderson
minihearing with approval).
Eisen (D.C.) IV, 54 F.R.D. at 567.
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178-79.
So many articles have been written about the Eisen case that it would be fruitless to even
attempt to list them all. One student article which covers almost every issue in the case is Note,
54 B.U.L. REv. 111 (1974).
8 Judge Oakes, joined by Judge Timbers, dissenting from the decision of the Second
Circuit denying a petition for a rehearing en bane, Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1021.
1 Justice Douglas, joined by justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting in part, Eisen, 417
U.S. at 179.
"o Eisen Il1, 479 F.2d at 1022 (dissent from court's refusal to hear the case en bane).
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Judge Oakes felt that even it were proper to require that individual
notice be sent to all identifiable members of Eisen's class and to tax
the costs of such notice to Eisen, the circuit court had erred in not
considering "one of several other alternatives to the panel's burial of
larger-number plaintiff class actions.""1
The plaintiff class might, for example, be divided into much smaller
subclasses . . . of odd lot buyers for particular periods, and one
subclass treated as a test case, with the other subclasses held in
abeyance. Individual notice at what would probably be a reasonable
cost could then be given to all members of the particular small
subclass who can be easily identified.'2
Justice Douglas quoted Judge Oakes in his separate opinion in
Eisen, and in a similar vein, continued:
Or a subclass might include those on monthly investment plans, or
payroll deduction plans run by brokerage houses. The possibilities,
though not infinite, are numerous.
The power to create a subclass is clear and unambiguous. Who
should be included and how large it should be are questions that
only the District Court should resolve. Notice to each member of
the subclass would be essential under Rule 23(c)(2); and under Rule
23(c)(2)(A) any notified member may opt out. There would remain
the question whether the subclass suit is manageable. But since the
subclass could be chosen in light of the nonmanageability of the size
of the class whose claims are presently before us, there is no appar-
ent difficulty in that sense. 3
These opinions suggest a novel approach to the problems presented
by actions pursued by gargantuan classes. Instead of forcing a
possibly meritorius action to be dismissed solely because of the ex-
pense of notifying the class members, the class could be divided into
small subclasses. Both opinions suggest that the division of the class
could be made upon lines which would make notice economically
feasible, permitting the action to continue pursued by the separate
subclasses. Judge Oakes took this line of reasoning even one step
further. He suggested that, after the division of the class, one of the
subclasses could pursue the action as a "test case."14 Presumably, a
decision on the merits of the test case would be binding on all parties
on both sides of the action and would make further litigation of the
" Id. at 1023.
12 Id.
11 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 180-81 (footnote omitted).
" Eisen I, 479 F.2d at 1023.
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issues determined in the test case unnecessary. This note will examine
the problems inherent in a subdivision of a class, as well as the effects
that a final judgment on the merits in a test case pursued by one of
the resultant subclasses would have upon the rights of members of
the nonlitigating subclasses.
III. DIVISION OF THE CLASS
Rule 23(c)(4)(B) vests the district courts with the discretionary
power to divide a class into subclasses. The rule, however, sets forth
no criteria for making such a division, although it does provide that
each subclass is to be accorded class treatment under rule 23. t1 The
usual situation in which a court will divide a class into subclasses
occurs when the class contains members whose interests are divergent
or antagonistic."6 In such a situation, it would be proper for the court
to divide the class into nearly homogeneous subgroups in order to
separate the adverse and atypical members of the class.
There is no indication that the class alleged by Eisen, consisting
of all odd-lot purchasers who were allegedly charged excessive fees
in violation of the law, 7 contained members whose interests were
clearly divergent from, or antagonistic to, the interests of the class
as a whole. Futhermore, it was judicially determined that Eisen would
adequately represent the claims of the class.'" Thus, none of the fac-
tual situations that traditionally justify the division of a class into
subclasses were present in the Eisen case. The only apparent justifica-
tions for dividing Eisen's class are unrelated to the interests of the
class members-division of the class in order to make the action
11 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(4):
When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
1 7 C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790 at 189
(1972).
11 Odd-lot transactions are exclusively handled by special odd-lot dealers. The cost of an
odd-lot purchase to a consumer includes both a standard brokerage commission and the odd-
lot differential. The differential is a figure amounting to a fraction of a point for each share
traded that is added to the customer's purchase price and subtracted from the sale price. During
the period at issue in the Eisen case, the odd-lot differential was 1/8 of a point (12- cents) per
share of stock selling below $40 per share and '/ of a poini (25 cents) per share on stock selling
above $40 per share.
It was Eisen's contention that the odd-lot differential was set at an excessive amount during
the time in controversy in violation of the antitrust laws.
'8 Eisen (D.C.) III, 52 F.R.D. at 261.
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more manageable, or division of the class to allow a possibly merito-
rious action to proceed when the costs would otherwise be prohibitive.
There is no precedent for dividing a class into subclasses for either
of these reasons.
The only judicial supports for dividing a class into subclasses
purely for manageability or economic reasons are the opinions of
Justice Douglas and Judge Oakes, although neither of these opinions
discussed the justifications for such a division. Both opinions merely
stated that the power to divide a class into subclasses existed and it
could be used in this manner.
In order to comply with the prerequisites for the maintenance
of a class action contained in rule 23(a), the existence of a class must
be shown." Thus classes may not be constructed along purely fanciful
lines in order to create a class of desirable qualities (e.g., complete
diversity). Classes must be formed upon rational dividing lines that
generally correspond to the interests of the members .2  Thus any
subdivision of a class should be along lines related to the interests of
the members of the class and precisely enough defined so that the
interests of a single class member for a single transaction would be
represented by but one subclass. As observed by Justice Douglas, the
membership and size of each subclass are matters uniquely within the
competence of the trial court.
Assuming that a division of the class can be made, as suggested
by Oakes and Douglas, it becomes necessary to decide who should
be given notice of the action. Rule 23 provides that all members of a
rule 23(b)(3) class (Eisen's action involved such a class) will be bound
by the outcome of any action brought on their behalf unless they
request exclusion from the suit.2" Rule 23 also provides that, after the
division of a class into subclasses, each subclass is to be accorded
class treatment.2 2 It is clear, therefore, that the members of any liti-
" This requirement is inherent in the requirement, stated in rule 23(a), that "[olne or more
members of a class may sue or be sued .... " (emphasis added). See 7 C.A. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760 (1972).
2 This is specifically required by FED, R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) which requires that there be
questions of law or fact common to the class.
21 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2):
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class
if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
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gating subclass would be bound by the outcome of that subclass
action unless they affirmatively requested exclusion from the pro-
ceeding. The Supreme Court decision in Eisen makes it clear that all
identifiable members of a litigating subclass would have to be given
notice of the pendency of the action in order to comply with the
requirements of rule 23.3
IV. THE TEST CONCEPT
The appeal of the test class concept is that in a single action the
rights and duties of all of the interested persons can be determined
finally, making further litigation of the issues determined in the test
case unnecessary. It is elementary that for an action to be completely
effective in this manner, all of the interested persons involved must
be bound by the outcome of the test case. There are only two ways
in which all of the persons actually interested in the subject matter
of the dispute (i.e. the defendants and the members of the original
class) can be bound by litigation involving only a subclass of such
persons: (1) all of the individuals can agree in a legally enforceable
manner to be bound by the outcome of the test case,24 or (2) all of
the interested persons can be bound by the test case as a matter of
law.
In the situation posed by the Eisen case, the first alternative of
an agreement to be bound is clearly impractical. There is no reason
to believe that the notice that would be required to solicit the agree-
ment of all 'Members of Eisen's class to be bound by the outcome of
the test case could be accomplished more cheaply than could the
notification of all identifiable members of Eisen's class in order to
afford them an opportunity to opt out of the action. Since the expense
of notifying the class is what put an end to the Eisen suit, the expense
of soliciting the agreement of all class members to be bound by a test
case would also be prohibitive.
The only situation in which the subclass litigation could practi-
cally serve as an actual test case would be where all interested parties
would be bound by the outcome of the test case as a matter of law.
Stated another way, the concept is workable only if the final decision
in the test case would preclude all interested persons from relitigating
the issues determined in the test case. There are two factors that must
be considered in determining the preclusive effect of a final judgment
on the merits in the test case upon members of the nonlitigating
23 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173.
24 See Note, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1048 (1967).
NOTES
subclasses: (1) notions of due process of law requiring that some
notice be given to those who are to be bound by an action,25 and (2)
the law concerning the application of collateral estoppel and res judi-
cata. As shown below, these two factors interact in such a way that
the ideal function of the test case concept is simply unworkable in the
situation posed by the Eisen case.
A. Due Process of Law and Notice
Courts have often held that due process of law prohibits binding
a person by the judgement of an action of which he had no notice or
in which he has no opportunity to appear.26 Binding a person in such
a situation violates basic values of our judicial system: the right of a
litigant to present his arguments to a court before having his rights
adjudicated and the importance of this personal participation to the
fairness of the resultant decision. One of the more frequently utilized
corollaries of this rule is that a stranger to an action cannot be
estopped on the basis of a judgment in that actionY. It has been said
that the determination of a litigant's rights without affording that
person an opportunity to personally participate in the action under-
mines the capacity of the courts to command respect for their deci-
sions.2
Since the fundamental requirement of due process is an oppor-
tunity to be heard, the notice of the pendency of an action must be
of such nature so as to reasonably convey the required information.29
Rule 23(c)(2), as construed by the Supreme Court in Eisen, requires
21 This contention is supported by cases such as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971); and
Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.
Pa. 1970). See also collection of cases in 16 AM. JUR.2D Constitutional Law § 560 (1964); 7
C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 16, § 1786 at 140; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356, 396 (1967); Mariaist & Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process
and Class Action, 49 TEXAS L. REV. I, 9 (1970); Developments in the Law-Multiparty
Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 939 (1958).
2 See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Granis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176
U.S. 398 (1900); and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport,
247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); and Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n. v. McDonnough, 204 U.S. 8, 17
(1907).
21 See, e.g., Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1974) and Vestal, Rationale of
Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis L. J. 29, 33-34 (1964).
n This was the fundamental holding of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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that all identifiable members of a rule 23(b)(3) class be sent individual
notice of the pendency of the action that informs them either to
affirmatively opt out of the action or be bound by the outcome. Since
rule 23(c)(4)(B) provides that each subclass shall be afforded class
treatment, rule 23(c)(2) would require that notice be sent to all identi-
fiable members of the litigating subclass (assuming the action was
brought pursuant to rule 23(b)(3), as was the case in Eisen). There is
no requirement that notice be sent to members of other subclasses
since each subclass will be afforded class treatment separately and
each person will be notified when his or her particular subclass is
preparing to litigate. In any event, a member of one subclass would
not be afforded the opportunity to appear or to opt out of an action
pursued by a different subclass.
Thus it is obvious that the defendants cannot use the judgment
in an action pursued by one subclass to bind the members of another
subclass, because the members of the nonlitigating subclass were
given neither notice nor an opportunity to enter an appearance as
required by due process of law.3" Certainly, this seems to be the
result intended by the drafters of the rule. The advisory committee's
note to rule 23 explicitly states that the requirement of notice to all
identifiable members of a rule 23(b)(3) class is intended to meet the
requirements of due process.3' The Supreme Court relied exclusively
upon the advisory committee's note to rule 23 and two cases dealing
with the due process requirements of notice" in reaching the decision
in Eisen that rule 23 requires individual notice to all identifiable
members of a rule 23(b)(3) class; this reasoning lends strength to the
proposition that due process would prohibit binding the members of
one subclass by the judgment in an action pursued by a different
subclass.
These due process considerations are less compelling where a
nonlitigating subclass is attempting to use a favorable judgment in the
test case offensively against the defendants. In this situation, the
parties against whom the preclusive effect of the prior judgment is
urged (the defendants in the Eisen situation) were parties to the prior
action. Not only would the defendants have received notice of the
action, but they presumably would have appeared and defended.
Futhermore, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is generally
3 See authorities cited supra note 24.
31 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
32 The Court cited only Mullane, supra note 25 and Schroeder v. City of New York, 371
U.S. 208 (1962), in its discussion of the requirements of rule 23(c)(2) notice. Eisen, 417 U.S.
at 175.
NOTES
permitted by the courts when the prior action was "fully and fairly
litigated. '33 Thus, it would appear that due process considerations
alone would not prohibit the utilization of the judgment in the test
case against the defendants by members of subclasses other than the
test class.
B. Res Judicata-Collateral Estoppel
Since it has already been shown that notions of due process
prohibit binding the members of nonlitigating subclasses by an unfa-
vorable judgment in the test case, it is unnecessary to discuss the
effects of the concept of collateral estoppel on the members of the
nonlitigating subclasses. As previously indicated however, due pro-
cess considerations are unlikely to prohibit the nonlitigating sub-
classes from asserting the preclusive effect of the judgment in the test
case against the defendants. Therefore, in order to complete the anal-
ysis of the binding effect of a final judgment in a test case, it is
necessary to consider whether collateral estoppel could be utilized by
nonlitigating subclasses to preclude the defendants from relitigating
issues determined in the test case.
Collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, 34
is a facet of res judicata. Roughly speaking, collateral estoppel pre-
cludes a party in one action from asserting or denying an issue that
has been conclusively determined in a prior suit in which the party
or his privy has participated. 35 A traditional requirement for the
assertion of the preclusive effect of an issue determined in a prior
action is mutuality of estoppel. Mutuality requires that the party
seeking to assert the preclusive effect of the prior judgment must
himself have been bound by that prior judgement. 31
In the test case situation posed, where one subclass is taken as a
test case and litigates the action to a final judgment on the merits, it
* See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964); Teitelbaum Furs,
Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606-07, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963).
11 Allan D. Vestal is the commentator who first suggested that the confusion between the
terms "res judicata" and "collateral estoppel" could be avoided by substituting for them the
terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" respectively. Professor Vestal has written a
great many articles dealing with both res judicata and collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Vestal, The
Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1963); Vestal, Preclusion/Res
Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158; Vestal, Procedural
Aspects of Res Judicata/Preclusion, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 15.
5 Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301,
302-03 (1961).
19 Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. I
(1969).
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is clear that strict application of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
would prevent both the nonlitigating subclasses or the defendants
from taking advantage of the test case judgment. First, the nonlitigat-
ing subclasses cannot be bound by the judgment in the test case since
they would not have had the notice of the action or the opportunity
to appear required by due process of law. Since the defendants could
not have used a favorable judgment to preclude members of nonliti-
gating subclasses from relitigating issues determined in the test case,
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel would prohibit members of the
nonlitigating subclasses from utilizing a judgment in the test case to
bind the defendants. If mutuality of estoppel were to be strictly ap-
plied in this situation, it is clear that the test case concept could never
perform its proper function of binding all of the persons interested
in the action and eliminating the necessity of further lawsuits.
There is no question that the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
has been greatly eroded in recent years .3 The demise of the require-
ment of mutuality was first signaled by the landmark decision of
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa-
tion .3 The reasoning of Bernhard has been recognized not only by
numerous commentators, but by the Supreme Court itself.39 In Bern-
hard, Justice Traynor set forth what has come to be known as the
Bernhard doctrine of collateral estoppel:
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res judi-
cata differ fundamentally from the criteria for determining against
whom a plea of res judicata may be asserted. The requirements of
due process of law forbid the assertion of a plea of res judicata
against a party unless he was bound by the earlier litigation in which
the matter was decided. . . . He is bound by that litigation only if
he has been a party thereto or in privity with a party thereto ....
There is no compelling reason, however, for requiring that the party
asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in
privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.
"' The erosion of the requirement of mutuality has been generally, but not universally,
praised. Some articles in support of the demise of mutuality are the following: Currie,
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957);
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965); Note, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 724 (1967); and Note, 47 N.C.L. REV. 690 (1969). Articles which defend the mutuality
requirement include: Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45
IND. L.J. 1 (1969); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L.
REV. 301 (1961) and Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor
Privies, 57 HARV. L. REv. 98 (1943).
a' 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
3 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323-24
(1971).
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No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the re-
quirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a
previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three ques-
tions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there
a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudi-
cation? 0
Commentators generally agree that there are four basic factors
underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1) the doctrine helps
end litigation,4 (2) it protects private litigants from the necessity of
litigating the same cause of action or issue more than once,4" (3) it
allows each litigant to have his day in court, and (4) it fosters the
stability of judgments." There is also general agreement that other
factors should influence any decision dealing with a plea of collateral
estoppel." It is important to note that many courts have placed limi-
tations upon the assertion of a plea of collateral estoppel, one of the
most common being a limitation of collateral estoppel to defensive
use only."
Applying these new concepts of collateral estoppel to the test
case situation, it appears that there is only one combination of cir-
cumstances in which a court would allow the nonlitigating subclasses
to preclude the defendants from relitigating the issues determined in
'o 19 Cal. 2d at 811-13, 122 P.2d at 894-95.
" Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEo. L.J. 857
(1966).
42 Comment, 18 VILL. L. REV. 207, 211 (1972).
Vestal, supra note 3.
Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 606, 375 P.2d 439, 441
(1962).
Is The most important of those considerations are: Would the application of collateral
estoppel under the unique circumstances of the case under consideration lead to anomalous
results? Did the party against whom the plea is asserted have the ability and incentive to litigate
the issue or issues to be precluded to the utmost in the prior action? Did the party against whom
the estoppel is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision asserted to be
conclusive? See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965);
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281 (1957); Note, 41 Miss. L.J. 497 (1970); and Note, 52 N.C.L. REv. 836, 846 (1974).
11 For a discussion of the offensive/defensive distinction, see Note, 35 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1010 (1967) and Note, 47 N.C.L. REv. 690, 692-94 (1969). For an exhaustive statement
of the Bernhard doctrine in courts outside California, including the offensive/defensive distinc-
tion, see Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 38-46 (1965).
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the test case. First, the jurisdiction in which the subsequent action was
brought would have to be one which had not only discarded the
mutuality of estoppel doctrine, but also allowed the preclusive effect
of a prior judgment to be utilized offensively by a nonparty to that
prior action. In addition, the issues in the test case must have been
determined in such a manner that the court in the subsequent action
would hold those issues to have been fully and fairly litigated. In this
situation, a court could allow the nonlitigating subclasses to bind the
parties opposing the class to the judgment in the test case. This state
of affairs would be extremely advantageous to the nonlitigating sub-
classes. If the judgment were against the class, notions of due process
would prevent them from being bound by the test case judgment; if
the judgment were against the defendants, the nonlitigating sub-
classes could utilize that judgment offensively to preclude the
defendants from denying liability in a subsequent action. This would
not, however, achieve the goals for which the subclass and test case
concepts were suggested, since the members of nonlitigating sub-
classes could still not be bound by an unfavorable judgment if they
had received no notice.
There are few cases dealing with the application of the principles
of preclusion that are direct authority for the proposition that, at
least in the federal court system, collateral estoppel may properly be
asserted in a subsequent action by a nonparty to the first action
against a party to the prior action. In United States v. United Air
Lines, Inc.,"7 the district court held, and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment on the grounds that in a prior action based on the same
operative facts but pursued by different plaintiffs, the defendants had
been adjudicated negligent. The case involved the collision over Ne-
vada of a United Air Lines passenger plane with a United States Air
Force jet. The crash killed all forty-two passengers and five crew
members of the United plane and both Air Force pilots. Actions were
brought by survivors of the deceased passengers in eleven different
jurisdictions." The first suit to reach a final decision was in a Califor-
nia federal district court and resulted in a judgment for the plantiff
on the issue of the airline's negligence. The plaintiffs in Washington
moved for summary judgment on the theory that the California judg-
11 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), affd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.) (adopting district court's discussion of mutuality of collateral estoppel),
cert. dsm'd, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
11 Suits are filed in United States district courts in California, Florida, Iowa, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.
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ment was conclusive as to the issue of liability, and that defendant
was precluded from denying its negligence. The court, after noting
that defendants had full opportunity to defend, that extensive deposi-
tions had been taken, and that many hundreds of interrogatories had
been completed, granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
despite the fact that the plaintiffs were not bound by the California
judgment.49
In Humphreys v. Tann,0 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit rejected the notion that a prior judgment dismissing the
claims against the defendant precluded a different plaintiff in a subse-
quent suit based on the same factual occurrence from relitigating the
issue of the defendant's negligence. The case involved a mid-air colli-
sion over Urbana, Ohio between a Trans World Airlines jetliner and
a smaller Beech Baron aircraft owned by the Tann Company. Nu-
merous lawsuits were filed in various state and federal courts. A
number of the actions arising out of the air crash, including the
Humphreys action, were transferred to the Southern District of Ohio,
Dayton Division for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings. The first action to come to trial resulted in a verdict for the
plaintiff against TWA only and judgment was entered dismissing the
actions against Tann by the plaintiff and TWA on its cross-claim.
Tann then filed a motion in the Humphreys action seeking to pre-
clude Humphreys from proving the accident resulted from the negli-
gence of Tann on the basis of the prior judgment. The court, after a
fine discussion of the recent evolution of the collateral estoppel doc-
trine, held:
While the doctrine of collateral estoppel permits a prior judg-
ment to preclude relitigation of an issue previously determined on
its merits, it may be applied in favor of a stranger to the first action,
but only against a party to that action. This has been true from the
11 One of Judge Hall's statements in this case is particularly helpful.
Throughout the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judicial Code and other
Statutes of the United States, the recurrent phrase is found "in the interest of
justice."
It would be a travesty upon that concept to now require these plaintiffs who are
the survivors of passengers for hire on the United Air Lines plane to again re-litigate
the issue of liability after it has been so thoroughly and consummately litigated in
the trial court in the 24 consolidated cases tried at Los Angeles. There is every reason
"in the interest of justice" for not invoking the rule requiring identity of parties [the
mutuality of estoppel doctrine], and no reason in justice or law for invoking it in these
cases.
216 F. Supp. at 728-29.
"1 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
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beginning of the judicial development of the theory of collateral
estoppel. In Bernhard v. Bank of America it was stated that three
questions are determinative of the issue and that all must be an-
swered affirmatively. The third question, "Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication?" must be answered in the negative in this case.
Humphreys' administrator is not bound, under this classic test of
preclusion, by the verdict in the [prior] case. Writing for a unani-
mous Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue v. University of Illinois
Foundation Justice White stated the rule as follows:
Some litigants - those who never appeared in a prior ac-
tion - may not be collaterally estopped without litigating
the issue. They have never had a chance to present their
evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohib-
its estopping them despite one or more existing adjudica-
tions of the identical issue which stand squarely against
their position. 402 U.S. at 329, 91 S. Ct. at 1443.11
Finally, in Garcy Corporation v. Home Insurance Company,5
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that although the
defendants could not properly assert the judgment of a prior action
against the plaintiff, the plaintiff could use the judgment in that prior
action to preclude the defendants from relitigating the issue of defen-
dants' knowledge. In this case, the plaintiff owned five buildings and
was in the process of having them demolished. Before the wrecking
crew had completed the destruction of all the buildings, they were
destroyed by fire. The Aetna State Bank, the mortgagee of the build-
ings, brought an action against the defendant insurance companies.
That action resulted in a decision holding that although the defen-
dants were liable for the loss, that there was no damage on the theory
that the buildings were under contract to be demolished.53 The owner
then brought his own action against the same defendants on the same
insurance policies. The plaintiff, however, alleged additionally that he
had been attempting to sell the most valuable building before the
wrecking crew reached it and, that since the fire destroyed the build-
ing before the wrecking crew reached it, plaintiff had in fact suffered
loss and that the defendants were liable to the extent of the policy
coverage. The court said:
Defendants did not plead collateral estoppel of the Aetna case
against plaintiff. Such a pleading would have been inappropriate for
" Id. at 671.
52 496 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1974).
0 Aetna State Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 345 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. III. 1972).
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two reasons. First, there is no privity between mortgagor and mort-
gagee; defendants cannot raise collateral estoppel against a party
which did not participate in the previous case. lB Moore's Federal
Practice § 0.411 [12], at 1673 (2d ed., 1974). Second, the difference
between the factual contexts eliminates identify of issue on the dam-
ages question. 4
However, the court also held that:
In Aetna, Judge Marovitz found that Garcy Corp., the mortga-
gor, had given defendants notice of its plans for demolition. The
finding was necessary to the court's holding that the mortgagee had
not violated its duty under the notice provision in the mortgage
clause quoted below. Plaintiff asserts collateral estoppel against
defendant's present attack on the factual finding of notice of demo-
lition. We believe plaintiff is entitled to invoke collateral estoppel
despite the lack of mutuality of privity. Federal Savings & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973); Factor v. Pen-
nington Press, Inc., 230 F.Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1963). While plain-
tiff was not a party to Aetna, defendants were; they had a full
opportunity to litigate the issue of their knowledge of the proposed
demolition. Defendants are now bound by the finding that they had
knowledge.55
Thus this decision graphically illustrates that collateral estoppel may
be used by a party who cannot be bound by a prior adjudication to
preclude a party to the prior action from relitigating issues deter-
mined in the first case.
Applying these principles to the Eisen test case hypothetical, it
seems apparent that a judgment holding the defendants liable to the
plaintiff subclass in the first action to come to final judgment could
be utilized, at least in the federal courts, to preclude the defendants
from denying liability in subsequent actions brought by different sub-
classes. First, the basic issues of law and fact to be determined in the
first action and in any subsequent action are identical. "6 Second, the
parties against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is being urged in
the subsequent actions would have had both the opportunity and the
incentive to litigate all the issues in the first action.57 Furthermore, a
51 Garcy Corporation v. Home Insurance Company, 496 F.2d at 480.
5 Id. at 483.
-1 The issue in the Eisen case, aside from damages, was the liability of the defendants to
members of the plaintiff class for charging and collecting the odd-lot differential which had
allegedly been set at an excessively high amount. In the absence of any new, different or
additional evidence, this issue would be the same in any action pursued by any of the subclasses.
11 Defendants in the situation posed would be aware that the first action was a "test case"
and that the members of the remaining subclasses were "lurking in the wings" awaiting the
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ruling precluding the defendants from relitigating the issues decided
in the first action would not create the possibility of anomalous re-
sults. 58 Thus, assuming that the issues were fully and fairly litigated
in the test case situation, it would seem that at least some courts
would allow members of nonlitigating subclasses to utilize a favor-
able judgment in the test case to preclude the parties opposing the
action from relitigating any issues determined in the test case.
V. CONCLUSION
The suggestion of Judge Oakes that Eisen's class be divided into
subclasses with one subclass pursuing the action as a "test case"
seems to be simply unworkable. The apparent goal of the test case
concept is to bind all interested parties to the judgment of a single
action, making further litigation unnecessary. This goal however, is
impossible to effectuate. It is not possible as a practical matter to
solicit the agreement of all persons interested in the action to be
bound by the judgment of the test case; it would require notification
of the class members similar to that which made the pursuit of Eisen's
action economically impossible. It is also impossible to bind all of the
interested persons in the case to the judqment in the test case. Mem-
bers of the nonlitigating subclasses cannot be bound by the result of
the test case litigation as a matter of due process of law unless they
receive notice of the action and are given an opportunity to appear.59
Such notification is financially impractical. On the other hand, it is
possible to envision a situation where the defendants could be bound
by the result of the test case. That situation could occur in a jurisdic-
tion where the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel was not applied and
decision. This knowledge, presumably would lead the defendants to fully litigate the issue of
their liability. See Zdano v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
u' There is no danger in the hypothetical test case situation that the application of collat-
eral estoppel would create anomalous results since it has been assumed that the test class
prevailed, on the merits in the first instance. However, if the defendants prevailed on the merits
in the first action to come to final judgment and subsequently, in an action brought by a
different subclass, the plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of the case, the situation would be quite
different. There, application of the Bernhard doctrine in the face of the nonuniform results
would clearly be inequitable. No court should apply the Bernhard doctrine when to apply it
would be to work an injustice.
As a practical matter this set of events would seem to be highly unlikely. If the defendants
prevailed on the merits in the first instance it is doubtful that anyone could be found to subsidize
a subsequent action by a different subclass involving exactly the same facts and law.
For an in depth discussion of the multiple-claimant anomaly, see Currie, Civil Procedure:
The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965) and Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
" See discussion Part IV, A supra.
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where nonparties to a case are allowed to assert the preclusive effect
of a judgment offensively against a party to that judgment. In addi-
tion, the court in which the preclusive effect of the test case was urged
would have to be convinced that the issues of the test case were fully
and fairly litigated. Even in this ideal situation, the test case concept
fails to achieve its ideal goal of binding all of the interested persons
and making further litigation unnecessary. In all other situations, it
would appear that not even the defendants would be bound by the
result in the test case.
The only question remaining unanswered is whether the test case
concept might serve some useful function even though the test case
cannot have the ideal effect of binding all interested persons to the
litigation. Division of a large class such as Eisen's into smaller sub-
classes would have both advantages and disadvantages; it would allow
each subclass to litigate the rights of its members in a smaller more
manageable action, but it would force the courts to try the same basic
case several times, creating the risk of inconsistent adjudications.
A judgment in a test case that technically binds no one as a
matter of law might practically be determinative of the rights of all
the interested persons to the lawsuit. For instance, if the defendants
prevail upon the merits of the test case, it is difficult to conceive of
anyone who would undertake the costs of notice and attorney's fees
to bring a substantially identical action by a different subclass. The
judgment- in the test case does have some precedential value due to
the doctrine of stare decisis and it is unlikely that the decision in
subsequent cases would differ from that in the first.
On the other hand, if the subclass prevailed on the merits of the
test case, the roles are somewhat reversed, even assuming that none
of the nonlitigating subclasses could utilize the judgment in the test
case to preclude the defendants from relitigating the issues deter-
mined in the test case. The defendants could, of course, contest each
and every subclass action that is brought-and presumably there
would be a great number brought in the situation where the first
subclass won the test case. Such a tactic might result in the defen-
dants winning an occasional case against a subclass, although that
possibility becomes more unlikely if the first action was well-litigated
and intelligently decided. This strategy might also result in the total
recovery by all subclasses being stretched out over a long period of
time. However, there are costs involved in pursuing this course of
action. First, there are the legal fees involved in fighting each sub-
class. But more importantly, many statutes under which class actions
may be brought authorize the recovery of attorney's fees, for exam-
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pie, the antitrust laws."° If the class action is brought under one of
those statutes, the costs of this strategy is increased by the fees to be
paid the counsel for the subclasses. It is thus conceivable that the test
case judgment, if favorable to the subclasses, might place a great deal
of pressure on the defendants to settle the remaining subclass actions.
Although the test case concept cannot, as a matter of law, per-
form its ideal function of binding all interested persons to the judg-
ment in a single action, it would seem that the economics of pursuing
a legal action might cause the test case idea to work rather well. Since
the concept has at least some'vitality, there is a place for it in the
world of class actions. Class actions are a creature of equity," and
as such should be utilized to do justice. When a situation arises where
the division of a class into subclasses is being considered, it should
be borne in mind that the first subclass action to come to judgment
may operate in effect as it were a test case, so that divisions should
be made only when justice would be served thereby.
Howard S. Harris
E.g., Section 4 of the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
" Eisen III at 1023 (Judge Oakes, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
